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Abstract
The obligation to wear masks in times of pandemics
reduces the risk of spreading viruses. In case of the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, many governments
recommended or even obligated their citizens to
wear masks as an effective countermeasure. In
order to continuously monitor the compliance of
this policy measure in public spaces like restaurants
or tram stations by public authorities, one scalable
and automatable option depicts the application of
surveillance systems, i.e., CCTV. However, large-scale
monitoring of mask recognition does not only require a
well-performing Artificial Intelligence, but also ensure
that no privacy issues are introduced, as surveillance
is a deterrent for citizens and regulations like GDPR
demand strict regulations of such personal data. In
this work, we show how a privacy-preserving mask
recognition artifact could look like, demonstrate
different options for implementation and evaluate
performances. Our conceptual deep-learning
based Artificial Intelligence is able to achieve
detection performances between 95% and 99% in a
privacy-friendly setting. On that basis, we elaborate on
the trade-off between the level of privacy preservation
and Artificial Intelligence performance, i.e. the “price
of privacy”.
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 disease has evolved into a global
pandemic at the beginning of 2020. In order to fight
the spread of the virus, different measures, so-called
non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), were taken.
One of these measures, which a large share of countries
adopted, was the recommendation to wear masks
in public spaces [1]. For our work, we define
public spaces as any inside or outside area which
is generally accessible to people, including publicly
operated areas like libraries, tram stations, or public
authority buildings, but also privately owned spaces,
including restaurants or stores. While it is discussed
controversially how high the impact of such a policy
is, Greenhalgh et al. (2020) [2] conclude that it does
help in reducing the viral transmission. For instance, the
Czech Republic was one of the first European countries
to enforce mask wearing and first analyses point towards
that NPI having a major impact on the low number of
COVID-19 cases [3].
However, it remains of interest whether citizens
comply with the directive to wear masks for various
reasons—including hesitation to get more evidence
whether the mask policy contributes successfully to
contain the pandemic, for enforcement reasons and/or to
fine none-compliance. While manual inspections, e.g.,
at the entrance of restaurants or stores, are a possibility,
these actions require manual labor, do not scale well
and are difficult to enforce on larger spaces. In order to
allow for an automated examination of the compliance,
one could imagine to use surveillance solutions in
combination with Artificial Intelligence (AI).
While this solution entails many upsides, e.g.,
scalability and automation capabilities, it needs to be
in-line with the privacy regulations such as the GDPR
and it needs to be understood by citizens to trust
and accept the approach: The protection of personal
data, e.g., video streams revealing individuals’ faces,
is regionally required by legal regulations, such as the
GDPR in the European Union [4]1. As numerous studies
1This also includes where and how long personal data is stored,
show, people feel more insecure when their personal
steps are highly traceable and they compromise on their
privacy while being recorded [5, 6, 7].
Therefore, we propose an AI-based surveillance
artifact which ensures both (a) privacy and (b) high
performance of mask recognition. The proposed
solution could be used in diverse application scenarios,
for instance to contribute to a rigorous reporting of mask
coverage used for research purposes. Note, one aspect
we do not regard in this work are countermeasures if
citizens or customers do not comply with wearing a
mask, as we solely propose a monitoring option at this
stage.
With our research, we contribute to the body of
knowledge with three core aspects: First, we develop
a novel artifact which can be utilized to allow for a
privacy-preserving monitoring of mask coverage during
a pandemic. Second, we evaluate different design
choices on how to build the artifact and elaborate on
their performances, strengths and weaknesses. Third
and finally, we theorize on the trade-off between privacy
preservation and AI performance—as AI performance
decreases with increased privacy preservation and
vice-versa.
As an overall research design, we choose Design
Science Research (DSR) and base our approach on
Hevner and Chaterjee (2010) [8]. Hevner and Chaterjee
suggest a DSR project should cover at least three
cycles of investigation, a relevance cycle (targeting
the practical problem, see Section 2), a rigor cycle
(elaborating on the existing knowledge base, see
Section 3), and one or multiple design cycles (building
and evaluating the research artifact, see Sections 4
and 5). We finish our work with a discussion on the
broader impact (Section 6) as well as a summarizing
conclusion (Section 7).
2. Relevance Cycle: Defining the Problem
Recent studies stress: “If correctly used [...]
face masks [...] can contribute to reducing viral
transmission” [9, p. 1]. However, more evidence and
more insides on the level of influence are missing. To
get these insides, it is necessary to monitor the mask
coverage rate (and put the results in relation with other
factors). But, especially in public spaces, a monitoring
of the mask coverage proves difficult by manual
means. Therefore, first countries experiment with
automated, AI-based closed-circuit television camera
(CCTV) solutions for monitoring. For instance, France
is reportedly testing AI-based surveillance tools to check
which we will discuss at a later point when we explore different
implementation options in Section 4.
whether people are wearing masks on public transport.
To allow for this functionality, the country updated
their existing surveillance setup with additional software
to allow for monitoring mask-wearing, but also social
distancing [10]. However, we lack information on
where the analyses was performed, whether and how
this complies with the regulatory requirements of the
national GDPR implementation—as well as details on
the utilized AI technology.
While AI-based surveillance would in fact be
a technically feasible solution to monitor mask
recognition, any type of CCTV typically raises privacy
concerns [11]. The mass surveillance in the wake of
China’s social credit system raised extensive concerns
[12, 13, 14]. Individual examples of misuse of CCTV
exist as well, for instance, investigations were launched
after a museum guard used CCTV to spy on Angela
Merkel’s private apartment [15, 16].
To account for privacy in surveillance we,
therefore, aim to design artifacts ensuring both,
privacy-preservation and a high-performing recognition
of masks. To do so, we lay out different options
as depicted within Section 4. Initially though, we
are interested in existing work in the vicinity of our
proposed approach.
3. Rigor Cycle: Related Work
In this section, we ensure rigorous research by
elaborating on related work. To that end, we specifically
focus on privacy protection within the European Union
(EU) and algorithms to preserve privacy in video-based
surveillance systems.
3.1. Data Protection and Privacy
In 2018, the EU implemented the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Among its primary
objectives are the control of individuals over their
personal data as well as on simplifying the regulatory
environment for international organizations by unifying
the regulation within the EU [4].
With regard to privacy, one important requirement is
that any processing of personal data must be justified. To
that end, simplified speaking, any data that can be linked
to an individual has to be regarded as personal data.
Furthermore, in order to process data, legal grounds or
individual consent reflect a justification. According to a
ruling of the European Court of Justice, a video stream
containing faces corresponds to containing personal
data, and, accordingly, underlies the GDPR regulation
[17]. If, however, a video stream shows no personal
data, the GDPR does not apply and no consent or legal
basis is required in that regard.
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One common approach to remove personal data from
any data to prevent the application of the GDPR is
its anonymization, i.e., the removal of any link to an
individual person. Once anonymized, the data does no
longer link to an individual person and does not underlie
the GDPR regulation.
At the same time, however, the general interest and
the concerns to privacy of an individual need to be
traded-off. In this case, the general interest is usually
considered as high, whereas the concerns to privacy are
considered low, since the processing merely serves the
purpose of allowing processing of data whilst ensuring
privacy on an individual level. Accordingly, no consent
is required. To that end, one option to approach this
task is to perform anonymization on the device itself.
Thus, no unanonymized data is available to any party
and that the unanonymized data is not stored. In this
case, anonymization is be performed on edge.
Therefore, to conclude, if the raw data leaves the
camera, it underlies the GDPR and a consent or legal
basis is required for its processing. On the other hand,
if data remains on the device or the transferred data is
anonymized, it does not underlie the GDPR regulations.
This understanding serves as a design guidance and will
be picked up later again.
In the following, we explore technical approaches
that preserve privacy in video-based surveillance
systems.
3.2. Approaches to Preserve Privacy in
Video-based Surveillance
Most approaches to ensure privacy in video
surveillance are based on anonymizing the video feed,
i.e. removing any data that may reveal an identity.
To that end, a two-step process is usually deployed:
First, identity revealing image segments (e.g. faces)
are identified and, second, modified. Whilst we
acknowledge that there are many identity-revealing
segments within an image, we focus on faces throughout
this work. Thus, the above depicted two-step process
corresponds to face recognition and its anonymization.
The task of face recognition has been widely
addressed in research. Indeed, especially since the
rise of deep learning, face recognition is increasingly
addressed through neural networks. Publications
addressing face recognition through deep learning are
omnipresent (e.g. [18, 19, 20, 21]) and indicate good
results.
Once faces are identified, commonly-used distortion
approaches to ensure privacy are masking, pixelation
and blurring [22, 23]. In masking, the identity-revealing
segments of an image are covered with a neutral
element, as, for example a black box [24, 25]. Whilst
those approaches most certainly address the issue of
privacy, they are not applicable to the design challenge
of this work, since a black box also removes any data
on whether a mask is worn or not. Second, pixelation
refers to the substitution of squared blocks of pixels with
its average [22]. Given its simplicity, it is commonly
used, as, for example, in television news in order to
ensure privacy of individuals within the image. Third,
in blurring, segments of the picture are blurred (e.g.
[26, 27]), i.e. making the segments less distinct. A
common approach for blurring is the application of a
Gaussian low-pass filter.
Evidently, the mentioned approaches align with
the general concept of privacy-enhancing technologies
(PETs) [28]. As such, PETs are aimed at protecting
an individual’s privacy by the use of technical means
[29]. Indeed, the provision of anonymity, pseudonymity,
unlinkability and unobservability of data subjects is a
core component of PETs [30]. As such, the above
described approaches contribute to and reflect PETs.
Aligned with the idea of PET, Fitwi et al. (2019)
[31] propose a lightweight solution to preserve privacy
with a special focus on the Internet-of-Things and edge
computing. As such, the authors argue that privacy
measures should already be built into camera equipment,
eventually making the camera a smart device only
transmitting privacy-preserving video signals. In their
approach, the authors rely on pre-trained machine
learning models that are loaded onto the camera
to compute privacy-preserving video streams on the
fly. Similar research is conducted by a number
of researchers (e.g., [32, 33]). To that end, those
approaches comply with anonymization approaches
required to bypass GDPR regulations.
On that note, we could also identify research aimed
at preserving privacy that are not suitable for the purpose
of this work. Chi and Hu (2015) [34] and Carillo
et al. (2008) [35], for example, propose algorithmic
approaches to encrypt parts of an image that can be
decrypted at a later stage in time. Thus, the requirement
of irreversible removal of identity-revealing data is
not met. Furthermore, Boyer and Veigl (2015) [36]
purpose a system that allows for privacy-preserving
video surveillance. The authors propose a system
that allows access to video surveillance for police
investigations. Whilst this use case does underlie the
GDPR, the authors introduce an authentication and data
protection instance in order to prevent misuse of the
video.
In conclusion, this section shows the importance
of privacy and how it can be enabled in video-based
surveillance. The question on how privacy can be
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ensured in video-based monitoring systems is well
addressed, however, to the best of our knowledge,
the intersection of privacy-preservation and mask
recognition has not yet been addressed in rigorous
research. Precisely, we were not able to find
any peer-reviewed work covering the AI-based mask
detection in genreal as well as privacy-preserving
detectio in specific. Thus, mask detection whilst
ensuring privacy constitutes our addressed research gap.
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Figure 1. Deployment options and resulting privacy
preservation
4. Artifact Design
In accordance with the design science research
paradigm, we first elaborate on our overview of design
choices [37] which are depicted in Table 1 on page 5.
As elaborated, we are confronted with two fundamental
design requirements (DRs) for the artifact: privacy
preservation (DR1) and recognition performance (DR2).
Regarding DR1, we regard two different design
principles (DPs) addressing the removal of personal data
of raw video/image data. We can either implement
a designated privacy-preserving service locally (e.g.
integrated in the camera) which removes any personal
data before forwarding the adjusted video data to the
potential user / web service (DP1a), or run the analyses
locally and only forward the result to the potential user /
web service (DP1b). DP1a and DP1b are exclusive.
For the precise implementations, so-called design
features (DFs), we make two choices. For the privacy
preserving service (DP1a), we choose to implement
a blurring of faces (DF1a), as this approach is
state-of-the-art in literature as well as in real world
applications and is therefore an accepted method from
a legal point of view [38].
In the case of not forwarding any personal data, we
choose to perform all calculation on edge, i.e., directly
on the (camera) hardware—and only output the result
of the analysis (DF1b). No personal data is saved
on the device and no personal data leaves it. Thus,
the GDPR requirements are satisfied if the artifact is
working flawlessly.
Regarding DR2, demanding a superior mask
recognition performance, we choose to utilize
state-of-the art AI techniques (DP2). Precisely, we
train a deep neural network to detect masks on images
showing people (DF2). Deep neural networks have
been proven to achieve close-to-perfect performances in
image classification [39].
The resulting possible combinations of DFs leaves
us with three viable combinations, which are depicted
in Table 2 on page 5. We have to differentiate on
two dimensions: which DF is utilized and where the
DF is deployed. In terms of deployment, it is either
possible to host each of the required services (privacy
preservation / AI recognition) on edge / directly on
the hardware (“provider side”) or to host the service
externally (“customer side”).
Privacy is violated if there are options for the
external / customer side to access personal data in
the image data. The different deployment options are
illustrated in Figure 1.
To gain an understanding of the performances of the
deep neural net, we start by calculating the baseline
performance. We require this initial benchmark to
later calculate the loss of performance with the raise of
privacy.
Option A is a combination of DF1a and DF2. The
privacy preservation, in our case blurring of the faces
(DF1a), is performed directly on edge and only the
edited images are put forward to an external service.
In this option, the mask recognition (DF2) is deployed
externally. This case depicts the most realistic scenario,
as the output of the camera hardware can still be utilized
for other purposes and mask recognition is only one of
them (depending on the customer). In this scenario,
the privacy preservation is non-liftable as only the
preprocessed data is available to the customer. On
the downside, it might lead to worse mask recognition,
which we will analyse in the upcoming evaluation.
Option B is a combination of DF1b and DF2.
The privacy preservation is guaranteed as the camera
hardware only outputs the numerical results of the
on edge mask recognition, e.g. the percentage of
people wearing masks. No image data is transmitted.
In this option, every aspect is embedded within one
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Table 1. Overview of design requirements, design principles and design features for proposed artifact
Design Requirement Design Principle Design Feature
DR1 (Privacy preservation):
The artifact should not
reveal personal data.
DP1a: Implement a designated
privacy preserving service.
DF1a: Implement bluring
of faces.
DP1b: Do not forward personal
data required within the
analysis (e.g., raw pictures),
but only the result of the analysis.
DF1b: Perform all calculations
on edge.
DR2 (Recognition performance):
The artifact should reach
superior mask recognition
performance.
DP2: Implement an AI-based
mask recognition service.
DF2: Implement a
deep neural network
for mask recognition.
Table 2. Overview of options for a privacy-preserving mask detection artifact
Privacy
preservation
Mask
recognition
Utilized
Design Features Pro Contra
Baseline None External service DF2 Flexible maskrecognition Privacy violations
Option A On edge External service DF1a + DF2 Non-liftableprivacy preservation
Reduced recognition
performance
Option B not req. On edge DF1b + DF2 Encapsulatedfunctionality
Fixed mask
recognition
encapsulated functionality. On the downside, the artifact
does not leave any flexibility, e.g., the option to use the
camera output for other analyses. The overview of the
options is summarized in Table 1 while the resulting
overall approach is depicted in Figure 2 on page 6.
5. Artifact Evaluation
As a next step, we implement the previously
described artifact design and evaluate two aspects, the
performance of each option (A and B) as well as the
influence of the blurring factor, i.e. the “degree of
anonymization”, on the AI’s detection performance.
5.1. Artifact Instantiation
As described in Section 4, there are two possible
options for designing a privacy-preserving mask
recognition artifact.
Option A ensures in a first step that no personal
image data (i.e., facial features which make a person
identifiable) is transmitted, e.g. to external web services.
Faces are detected on edge (regardless of whether
a person is wearing a mask or not) and blurred by
applying Gaussian blur. Gaussian blurring is achieved
by convolving each pixel of a recognized face with a
Gaussian kernel of variable size (factor f indicates the
ratio of the kernel size to the image size) in order to
create a blurred face. Figure 3 on page 6 depicts an
exemplary face without blurring (left) as well as the
same face (second image from left to right) disguised
with different blurring factors. While widely used [40],
face anonymization with Gaussian blur is discussed
controversially, as de-anonymization is possible under
certain circumstances [41]; e.g. Dufaux and Ebrahimi
(2010) [22] report in the case of applying a Gaussian
factor of 8 and while clear (not anonymized) pictures
are available to a potential attacker, recognition might
be possible. To counter de-anonymization attempts, it
is important to choose a low blur factor (leading to
high anonymization, see Figure 3) [42] as we do in the
remainder of this work. Therefore, our proposed artifact
uses Gaussian blurring for the moment, but alternatives
should be kept in mind.
In a subsequent step, the anonymized image data
is processed by a separate externally deployed mask
recognition service, which is capable of detecting masks
even on anonymized image data. The degree of blurring,
and therefore, anonymization, is dicussed in Section 5.3.
Option B performs mask recognition directly on
the edge. Thus, a person’s privacy is preserved by
not passing image data to external services at all, but
only transferring aggregated indicators such as the ratio
of persons wearing masks to persons without wearing
masks. Thus, in this case, anonymizing of image
data is not necessary, since images are not transmitted
to an external party anyway. From a technical and
deployment point of view, Option B therefore is
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Figure 3. Blurred faces
equivalent to the baseline, where raw data is directly
transferred to an externally deployed service, which then
takes care of mask recognition without addressing any
privacy aspects.
5.2. Artifact Performance
The evaluation of the artifact is based on image data
of persons who either wear a mask or do not—with
the aim of being able to distinguish them with the
highest possible performance, measured by the metric of
accuracy. The accuracy indicates the overall proportion
of correctly (=true) predicted observations a classifier
achieves. It reaches its best value at 1.0 (100%) and its
worst at 0 (0%).
accuracy =
TruePositives+ TrueNegatives
Positives+Negatives
(1)
While there are several publicly available data sets
depicting persons’ unmasked faces, data sets including
persons wearing (medical) masks are rare. Note, as
there is no data of mass surveillance footage publicly
available, we assume—as existing work shows [43,
44]—that images showing individuals can be retrieved
from pictures showing multiple individuals.
Our evaluation is based on two different data sets
showing individuals. The first originates from the
machine learning platform Kaggle and contains 1, 000
images, equally shared among masked and unmasked
persons [45]. Additionally, we utilize a data set of
persons [46] without wearing masks and automatically
place an artificial mask in front of 50% of the persons’
faces. This artificially created data set contains a total of
686 images per class.
To obtain a baseline performance, we train a
deep convolutional neural network based on the
MobileNetV2 architecture [47] and pre-trained it on the
ImageNet database [48], assigning each input image
depicting a person’s non-blurred face to the classes mask
or no mask. We use MobileNetV2 because on the
one hand it is a common architecture for this kind of
application and on the other hand it is optimized for
edge computing. We also fix the number of epochs at 15
to keep the training time within reasonable limits. For
training-test split, we use a common 75/25 ratio.
Option B is technically equivalent to the base case, at
least in terms of modeling, and therefore its performance
equals the baseline. Only the kind of deployment and,
thus, the aggregation of the model output ensures that
privacy is maintained in comparison to the baseline.
For Option A, however, we use images with blurred
faces to train a deep neural network with the same
architecture as in the base case. To blur the faces we
apply the state-of-the-art dlib face recognition model
based on the ResNet architecture [18] combined with a
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Gaussian filter which is applied to the rectangular facial
section identified by the recognition model.
Table 3. Performance comparison
Accuracy
Real Data Artificial Data
Baseline 1.00 0.99
Option A2 0.98 (−2%) 0.95 (−4%)
Option B 1.00 (±0%) 0.99 (±0%)
Table 3 compares the performances. The accuracy of
Option A decreases only a few percent on both data sets
when using a blur factor of 5. Overall, the performance
loss between baseline Option B and Option A is
therefore only minimal. This implies that an increase
in privacy (due to the blurring factor 5) causes only a
small loss in model performance.
5.3. Privacy vs. Performance Trade-off
Results illustrated in the previous subsection show
that instant mask recognition (baseline and Option
B) performs slightly better than anonymizing faces in
advance (Option A). Even if these differences are still
very small at a blurring factor of 5 (as depicted in
Table 3), it can be assumed that the performance of mask
recognition decreases with increasing blur.
Therefore, we have trained the mask recognition
model on faces with varying degrees of blurring
(see Figure 3). The degree of privacy preservation
corresponds to the inverted blur factor. This assumption
is based on the underlying mechanism of the blurring
factor itself. At very large values and thus a very small
kernel size, this factor causes an almost non-blurred
face. In contrast, a factor of 1 corresponds to a kernel
size that is equal to the image size, causing a maximum
blurred face.
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Figure 4. Privacy vs. Performance Trade-off
2blurring factor f = 5.0
Figure 4 shows how the model performance of mask
recognition actually decreases on both data sets with
increasing blur. The more a face is disguised and, thus,
the higher the privacy preservation, the more the model
performance decreases. We call this loss of performance
“price of privacy”. However, despite the maximum
possible blur (f = 1), it is still within an acceptable
range of 6% to 11% loss of model accuracy depending
on the data set.
6. Discussion
Based on the promising results we include a
statement of the broader impact of our work,
including its potential ethical aspects and future societal
consequences.
If we imagine an Option-A-based system being
in place on a large scale, possible benefits and
disadvantages arise from our research. On the upside,
we would be able to allow a recognition of masks to
monitor whether people reduce infection risks, e.g.,
within public spaces. As we propose a removal of
personal data on edge, it is not possible for consumers of
the service to trace back individuals—as the raw image
is not accessible. However, we need to discuss two types
of errors: First, the privacy preservation service failing
and, second, the mask detection service failing.
Although we were able to show accuracy rates
are fairly high throughout our experiments, no system
is perfect. Furthermore, we did not test it within
a real scenario, but on pictures only showing single
persons—the segmentation of large crowds would need
to be performed by a different service (on edge, as
suggested by Wang et al. (2020) [44]). In any case,
if the system would fail, it might be possible to trace
back individuals, as there is no guarantee of correct
face blurring. Reasons for failure could be many, e.g.,
technical errors in the camera image, but also biases
due to training. The latter could lead to discrimination
of certain groups which were not included in the initial
training.
If the mask recognition service fails, different
problems might be the result. On the one hand, if
the service detects too many masks being worn (when
in fact less are actually worn), situations might be
classified as “safe” by the system, when they are, in fact,
not safe. On the other hand, when the system does not
detect all masks (although they are worn) it could issue
wrong alarms, or, depending on the ability of the system
and the severity of the alarm, lock down areas.
We, therefore, encourage further research in the
reliance and fairness of AI-based systems, especially in
the area of surveillance. For instance, as previous work
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has shown, the COMPAS system used by US courts to
assess defendants’ risk of recidivism, was unfair towards
black people—although it was in productive use [49].
7. Conclusion
In 2020, the COVID-19 disease has evolved into
a global pandemic—and governments all over the
world reacted by taking different measures, so-called
non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). One of these
NPIs, in line with current research [2], constitutes the
obligation to wear masks in public spaces like stores,
restaurants, etc. [1]. One option to monitor the
compliance of citizens wearing masks is to rely on video
surveillance, e.g., closed circuit television (CCTV). This
option would have the benefit of being fully scalable
and possibly automatable. However, GDPR has strong
requirements on the handling of personal data (including
clearly visible faces) [4, 17] and citizens might feel a
violation of their privacy when being surveillanced [7].
To address this gap, this work proposes an AI-based
surveillance artifact which ensures both (a) privacy
and (b) high performance of mask recognition. We
demonstrate different options of privacy-preserving
methods (in-line with GDPR) and their resulting
performances. Depending on the chosen option, e.g.,
on edge or as an external service, our results show
accuracies between 95% and 99%. In conclusion,
we show that privacy-preserving mask recognition is
well-feasible.
By designing, implementing and evaluating our
artifact we contribute to the body of knowledge in three
meaningful ways. First, our novel artifact can be utilized
to allow for a privacy-preserving monitoring of mask
coverage during an epidemic like the flu or a pandemic
like COVID-19. Second, we evaluate different design
choices on how to build the artifact and elaborate on
their performances and capabilities to preserve privacy.
Finally, we theorize on the trade-off between privacy
preservation and AI performance—as AI performance
decreases with increased privacy preservation and
vice-versa. Our findings indicate that even with the
highest degree of privacy preservation we applied, the
loss of AI performance does not exceed 11%.
The generalizability of these results is subject to
certain limitations. One shortcoming of our work
is the fact that we utilize only images containing
single faces. To address this issue, recent work
examines the possibility to pre-process larger images
to extract single images with one person per image,
so-called segmentation [43, 44]. This step could be
easily implemented on-edge as well. Furthermore,
we only work with images of people wearing medial
masks—future work needs to show the efficiency of the
AI artifact with coloured masks as well. Additionally,
under certain circumstances recent research shows the
possibility to de-anonymize blurred pictures [41]. To
counter that, we use high blurring in our presented
Option A, while Option B does not require blurring at
all.
Apart from these limitations, further research
should be undertaken to investigate other aspects
of the endeavor. Engaging in a dialogue with
hardware providers on the (technical) possibilities of
implementing privacy-preserving measures would be
worthwhile. Especially in our presented Option A,
where only the blurring of faces occurs on chip
the options for other applications (apart from mask
recognition) are manifold. As there is no traceable
personal data left as the output of the camera system,
the video stream could be utilized for other cases. For
instance, following the introductory example [10], the
systems could additionally be used to monitor distance
rules, count the total amount of people, etc. In any of
these cases, a convenient user interface would need to
be designed, which we did not address in this work.
Depending on the use case, it would be important to
build user centric interfaces for end users to ensure
the technology can be put to practice. In regards
to the case presented in this work, mask recognition,
different applications are possible; it could be utilized to
simply count how many citizens are compliant (e.g., for
research purposes) or as a “red alert” warning system,
i.e., within smaller and crowded places. In the latter,
it would need to be discussed which actions would
be undertaken as a countermeasures if people do not
comply, e.g., automatic announcements over speakers or
else. Future work will hopefully give insights into these
suggestions, as a promising field of research lies ahead.
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